Hastings Law Journal
Volume 71

Issue 1

Article 5

12-2019

The Roper Extension: A California Perspective
Zoe Jordan

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Zoe Jordan, The Roper Extension: A California Perspective, 71 HASTINGS L.J. 197 (2019).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol71/iss1/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.

71.1 - JORDAN (DO NOT DELETE)

12/1/2019 8:25 PM

Notes
The Roper Extension: A California Perspective
ZOE JORDAN†
Although adulthood legally begins at age eighteen, young adults between the ages of eighteen
and twenty-one are distinct from the rest of the adult population. Many studies conducted over
the last two decades have revealed that the prefrontal cortex, the part of the brain responsible
for social and emotional maturity as well as impulse control, is not fully developed until near
the age of twenty-five. Thus, young adults have a neurobiologically-compromised ability to
exercise self-control, adequately consider the consequences of their actions, and resist
coercive pressures from others. Notably, the California Legislature has acknowledged the
need to treat young adults differently than the rest of the adult population by enacting laws and
programs that take their developmental deficiencies into account. Through these various
enactments, the legislature has demonstrated a desire to insulate and aid this age group even
though they are considered adults under the law. Despite giving these added protections and
assistance, the California Legislature has inexplicably failed to exempt young adults from the
most severe sentence our criminal justice system has to offer: capital punishment—a sentence
traditionally reserved for the most culpable individuals who commit the most egregious
crimes. Based on the diminished culpability of young adults and the legislature’s own
measures to offer additional assistance to these young adults, this Note proposes that the
minimum age at which a California citizen should be eligible for capital punishment should be
raised from eighteen to twenty-one.

† J.D. 2019, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; Executive Management Editor,
Hastings Law Journal. Thank you to my family for their unwavering encouragement and support throughout
the writing process and throughout law school. I am especially grateful for my father, Jim Jordan, who has
been my English teacher and faithful editor since I was in his high school English class as a junior. Many
thanks also to Professor Bloch for her support and edits throughout the writing process, Andrew Michaels for
offering advice and feedback, Alisha Patton and Alyxandra Vernon who both thoroughly aided me through the
editing process, and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy who authored the historic opinion that forms the basis of this
Note.
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INTRODUCTION
“Capital punishment must be limited to those offenders who commit ‘a
narrow category of the most serious crimes’ and whose extreme culpability
makes them ‘the most deserving of execution.’”1 In Roper v. Simmons, decided
in 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, under the United States
Constitution’s “cruel and unusual” punishment standard,2 the death penalty
could not be imposed on a juvenile, a person under the age of eighteen.3 In
making its determination, the Court found two factors persuasive: the first was
a growing national consensus against sentencing juveniles to death, and the
second was a comprehensive body of research establishing that the brains of
juveniles continue to develop, such that they are unable to fully understand and
control their actions.4 As a result, the Court found that juveniles are less
culpable for their crimes than older adults.5
Over the past decade and a half since the Roper decision, a new national
consensus has developed concerning the minimum age eligibility for the death
penalty.6 This consensus is based on numerous psychological and
neurobiological studies that have led many scholars, researchers, scientists, and
attorneys to agree that young adults, persons under the age of twenty-one,7
should not be sentenced to death because they are psychologically similar to
juveniles and, therefore, less culpable than older adults.8 In light of these new
1. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002)).
Roper was authored by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, who was the primary architect of the Court’s
proportionality doctrine. This doctrine gave way to categorial exemptions from the death penalty for juvenile
offenders, intellectually disabled offenders, and nonhomicide offenders. See Atkins, 536 U.S. 304; Roper, 543
U.S. 551; and Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008). Justice Kennedy also categorically exempted
juvenile offenders from life without parole sentences. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). As such, his
decisions lay the groundwork for this Note and offers a rationale under which Roper should be extended to
young adults.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment’s protection against “cruel and unusual”
punishment flows from the basic “precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and
proportioned to [the] offense.” Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311 (alteration in original) (quoting Weems v. United States,
217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910)).
3. Roper, 543 U.S. at 575; U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
4. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70 (including the parts of the brain responsible for responding to peer
pressure and making mature and responsible decisions).
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., Lee Rawles, Ban Death Penalty for Those 21 or Younger, ABA House Says, ABA JOURNAL,
(Feb. 5, 2018, 9:56 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/Ban_death_penalty_for_those_21_or_
younger_aba_house_says (“The ABA House of Delegates . . . asked all death penalty jurisdictions to ban
capital punishment for any offender who committed their crime at the age of 21 or younger.”).
7. I refer to persons between the ages of eighteen and twenty as “young adults” throughout this Note. I
also periodically refer to “emerging adults;” this term refers to a broader category of still-maturing adults,
encompassing those between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five.
8. See, e.g., Melissa S. Caulum, Note, Postadolescent Brain Development: A Disconnect Between
Neuroscience, Emerging Adults, and the Corrections System, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 729, 731.
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developments, the application of the death penalty to young adults is being
challenged in various states.9 Although it has already been argued that the
death penalty as applied to young adults violates the Eighth Amendment, this
Note extends that argument to a California-specific perspective.10
Because of the California Legislature’s intentional actions assisting and
safeguarding these young adults, California, whether through legislation,
judicial review, or referendum, should raise the age eligibility of the death
penalty to reflect the limitations of young adults and their culpability. The
State Legislature’s apparent awareness of young adults’ compromised
maturity, which is reflected in various pieces of legislation intended to protect
young adults from their own immaturity and lack of life experience, is
emphasized within this Note. Such protections infiltrate the California Code,
impacting the State’s criminal justice system, family code, consumer
protection laws, and other areas as well.
This Note proceeds as follows. Part I provides relevant background
information. Subpart I.A. discusses the history and status of the death penalty
in California and sheds light on the need to discuss applying the Roper
extension in California, a state that has not executed a single person since 2006

9. See, e.g., Otte v. State, 96 N.E. 3d 1288, 1290 (Oh. Ct. App. 2017) (“Otte alleged that ‘[b]ased on
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments’ evolving standards of decency, the death penalty is now a
disproportionate punishment for any offender who committed his capital crime before turning age twentyone.’”) (alteration in original); see also In re Phillips, No. 17-3729, 2017 WL 4541664 (6th Cir. July 20,
2017); Commonwealth v. Bredhold, No. 14-CR-161, 2017 WL 8792559, at *1 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Aug. 1, 2017);
Kentucky
v.
Efrain
Diaz,
No.
15-CR-584-001
(Ky.
Cir.
Ct.
Sept.
6,
2017),
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/files/pdf/KentuckyAge21DecisionEfrainDiaz.pdf.
10. See Andrew Michaels, A Decent Proposal: Exempting Eighteen-to Twenty-Year-Olds from the Death
Penalty, 40 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 139, 142 (2016). Andrew Michaels pioneered the academic
discussion of the Roper extension by laying the framework for its application to young adults. Id. His
scholarship inspired my own, as I also argue that the application of the death penalty to young adults in
California violates the U.S. and California Constitutions. See id. Michaels, along with many others, make the
more conservative argument that offenders under the age of twenty-one should be categorically exempted from
the death penalty; however, studies support arguments for a broader categorical exemption that would
encompass adults as old as twenty-four. See, e.g., RAE SIMPSON, MASS. INST. OF TECH YOUNG ADULT
DEVELOPMENT PROJECT 11 http://hr.mit.edu/static/worklife/youngadult/youngadult.pdf (“The brain isn’t fully
mature at 16, when we are allowed to drive, or at 18, when we are allowed to vote, or at 21, when we are
allowed to drink, but closer to 25, when we are allowed to rent a car.”). I, in line with Michaels, make the more
conservative argument with respect to the application of the death penalty in California because the state
legislature has promulgated ample evidence that it views eighteen to twenty-year-olds as lacking the life
experience and faculties necessary to make mature, responsible decisions and are, therefore, less culpable than
other adult offenders. It should be noted that others have written about the need to treat emerging adults
similarly to juveniles and that young adults should be ineligible to receive life without parole; however, those
articles take a more general approach in addressing their respective topics, whereas I focus the argument
around California. See Christine E. Fitch, Emerging Adulthood and the Criminal Justice System:
#Brainnotfullycooked #cantadultyet #yolo, 58 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 325 (2018) (making a more general
argument that emerging adults in the criminal justice system should be treated similarly to juveniles); Emily
Powell, Underdeveloped and Over-Sentenced: Why Eighteen to Twenty-Year-Olds Should Be Exempt From
Life Without Parole, 52 U. RICH. L. REV. ONLINE 83 (2018) (arguing that young adults should be ineligible to
receive life without parole).
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and has recently imposed a moratorium on the death penalty. Subpart I.B.
discusses the new national, post-Roper consensus against executing inmates,
particularly young and emerging adults, and Subpart I.C. explores the scientific
research supporting the argument that the minimum age at which one should
be eligible for capital punishment should be raised to twenty-one. Part II
discusses specific California statutes that evidence the legislature’s desire to
insulate young adults from some of the harsh realities associated with entering
adulthood. Finally, Part III lays out three arguments through which California
could and should raise the minimum age at which one is eligible for the death
penalty to twenty-one. First, the California Legislature should do so by
amending its death penalty statutes. Given its numerous demonstrations
evincing a collective belief that young adults need special protections, it is
surprising that the legislature has not already imposed such a limitation.
Second, in the absence of legislative action, the courts should raise the
minimum age at which a person is eligible for capital punishment to twentyone. Courts should exempt these young adults, finding that the current practice
violates the California Constitution, which historically has offered more
expansive protections to its citizens. Lastly, if the Legislature and courts are
unwilling to raise the minimum age eligibility, the people can propose a
referendum supporting this argument, which, if passed, would raise the
minimum age for the death penalty to twenty-one. Although recent
propositions have shown majority support for the death penalty, raising the age
eligibility is a modest adjustment in death penalty practice.
I. BACKGROUND
A. THE DEATH PENALTY IN CALIFORNIA
Several sections of the California Penal Code create the parameters for
who is death penalty eligible, and many have been convicted under these
statutes.11 Indeed, of all the fifty states, California has the largest number of
death row inmates by far.12 However, within the last fifty years, California
courts and the general populace have disagreed on whether the death penalty,
in general, is an appropriate and lawful punishment. In 1972, the California
Supreme Court found that the death penalty violated the state constitution;
however, despite the court’s decision, six years later, in 1978, California voters

11. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 37(a), 190(a), 3700 (West 2019).
12. See
Facts
About
the
Death
Penalty,
DEATH
PENALTY
INFO.
CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf (last updated May 31, 2019). It should be noted that
California has the largest general population of the fifty states—making up roughly twelve percent of the U.S.
population—which explains why California would have the highest total number of death row inmates. See US
States— Ranked by Population 2019, WORLD POPULATION REVIEW, http://worldpopulationreview.com/states
(last visited Nov. 6, 2019).

71.1 - JORDAN (DO NOT DELETE)

202

12/1/2019 8:25 PM

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71:197

superseded the courts and restored the death penalty via Proposition 17.13 Even
though the death penalty became constitutional again through Proposition 17,
executions were slow to resume. No executions took place until 1992,14 and
only thirteen executions took place between 1992 and 2006.15
Since 2006, executions in California have been stalled after U.S. District
Court Judge Jeremy Fogel blocked the execution of Michael Morales due to
concerns that lethal injection was being administered in a way that risked
exposing the recipient to intense pain, constituting cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.16 This decision created a de
facto moratorium on the death penalty in California pending restoration of
California’s procedures. In 2014, a different U.S. District Court Judge, Judge
Cormac J. Carney, found that California’s death penalty violated the Eight
Amendment in another way. Judge Carney found that the death penalty was
arbitrarily imposed and plagued with lengthy delays throughout the appellate
process such that it was cruel and unusual punishment.17 This case was later
overturned on procedural grounds, but the de facto moratorium from 2006
remained.
Outside of the courts, California voters reasserted their support for the
death penalty yet again in 2016 when a majority of less than five percent
passed Proposition 66, a measure intended to remove the procedural barriers
responsible for the lengthy delays.18 As actions were being taken to speed up
13. See People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972), superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 27. The California Constitution now provides that, “[t]he death penalty . . . shall not be deemed
to be, or to constitute, the infliction of cruel or unusual punishments within the meaning of Article 1, Section 6
nor shall such punishment for such offenses be deemed to contravene any other provision of this constitution.”
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 27.
14. In 1992, “Robert Harris . . . [was] the first individual executed in the state in two decades.” A
Timeline of the Death Penalty in California, STANFORD PROGRESSIVE (Oct. 2011).
15. Executions by State and Region Since 1976, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/number-executions-state-and-region-1976 (last visited Nov. 6, 2019); Ten Years
After Last Execution, California Still Far from Resuming Executions, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/6360 (Jan. 21, 2016); see also Paige St. John & Maloy Moore, These Are the
737 Inmates on California’s Death Row, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/projects/lame-death-row (showing that a slow execution rate leaves many inmates—currently 737, to be exact—on death
row).
16. Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
17. Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050 (C.D. Cal. 2014), rev’d, 806 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2015); Marc
Berman, Federal Judge Says California’s Death Penalty System Is “Unconstitutional,” WASH. POST (July 16,
2014, 1:04 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/07/16/federal-judge-sayscalifornias-death-penalty-system-is-unconstitutional/.
18. California’s voters actually had two competing propositions to choose from during the 2016 election:
in addition to Proposition 66, Proposition 62, which would have repealed the death penalty in California
altogether, was also on the ballot. By a narrow margin, voters passed Proposition 66, with 51.13% voting yes,
and 48.87% voting no. Proposition 62 was defeated 53.15% to 46.85%. See California Proposition 66, Death
Penalty
Procedures
(2016),
BALLOTPEDIA
[hereinafter
Proposition
66],
https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_66,_Death_Penalty_Procedures_(2016) (last visited Nov. 6,
2019); California Proposition 62, Repeal of the Death Penalty (2016), BALLOTPEDIA [hereinafter Proposition
62], https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_62,_Repeal_of_the_Death_Penalty_(2016) (last visited
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the appellate process, Governor Gavin Newsom issued an executive order
imposing a moratorium on the death penalty on March 13, 2019.19 His
executive order eliminated any current risk of execution for the 737 individuals
on death row; however, their sentences were not changed.20 Each person still
faces the possibility of execution if the moratorium were to be lifted in the
future. This lingering threat of execution is why advocacy against the death
penalty remains active and crucial. Cases continue to be appealed and
litigated,21 and county prosecutor offices still retain the discretion to pursue
death penalty sentences. For example, a month after the moratorium was
imposed, District Attorneys in four counties agreed to seek the death penalty
against the Golden State Killer.22 Because such prosecution continues,
advocacy must continue until the death penalty is repealed or abolished.
It is time for California’s death penalty statutes to reflect the research and
laws that impact and treat these young adults differently than the rest of the
adult population, by ensuring that the death penalty is reserved for those who
are the most culpable for their actions.
B. NATIONAL TRENDS IN APPLYING THE DEATH PENALTY, ESPECIALLY TO
YOUNG ADULTS
Executions and death sentences are becoming increasingly rare across the
nation. In 2018, twenty-nine of the nation’s fifty states still allowed the death
penalty, and yet only forty-two death penalty sentences were imposed, and
only twenty-five executions were carried out across the nation.23 Texas, alone,
was responsible for thirteen of these executions.24 Although the numbers have
slightly increased from 2017, according to the Death Penalty Information
Center:
Nov. 6, 2019). Proposition 66 was upheld by the Supreme Court of California in 2017. See Briggs v. Brown,
400 P.3d 29 (Cal. 2017), as modified on denial of reh’g (Oct. 25, 2017).
19. Tim Arango, California Death Penalty Suspended; 737 Inmates Get Stay of Execution, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 12, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/12/us/california-death-penalty.html.
20. Id.
21. Steve Gorman, Two California Supreme Court Justices Decry Death Penalty as “Dysfunctional,”
REUTERS (Mar. 28, 2019, 6:37 PM) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-california-death-penaty/twocalifornia-supreme-court-justices-decry-death-penalty-as-dysfunctional-idUSKCN1RA05Z.
22. Matthias Gafni, Prosecutors to Seek Death Penalty Against Golden State Killer Defendant, S.F.
CHRON. (Apr. 10, 2019, 7:34 PM) https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/Prosecutors-to-seek-deathpenalty-against-Golden-13757964.php.
23. The Death Penalty in 2018: Year End Report, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/2018YrEnd.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2019). In May 2019, New
Hampshire became the most recent state to abolish the death penalty. State and Federal Info: New Hampshire,
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federal-info/state-by-state/new-hampshire
(last visited Nov. 6, 2019). In 2019, the federal government ordered to reinstate the death penalty and has
scheduled executions. Tammy Kupperman et al., Barr Directs Federal Government to Reinstate Death
Penalty, Schedule the Execution of 5 Death Row Inmates, CNN POLITICS (July 15, 2019),
https://edition.cnn.com/2019/07/25/politics/justice-department-capital-punishment-barr/index.html.
24. The Death Penalty in 2018: Year End Report, supra note 23.
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2018 was a record-low year for death penalty usage in the United
States, as eighteen death-penalty states set or matched records for
the fewest new death sentences imposed in the modern history of
U.S. capital punishment. . . . Thirty-five U.S. States—including
sixteen that authorized capital punishment in 2018—did not impose
any death sentences in 2018, while California and Pennsylvania,
which collectively account for nearly one-third of the nation’s
death-row population, imposed record lows. Every western state
except Arizona and Nevada set or tied a record low, and Arizona,
which imposed two new death sentences, and Nevada, which
imposed one, were just one above their record lows.25
Setting Texas aside, a national consensus has developed and strengthened
against the imposition of the death penalty, without any reference to the
convict’s age.26 However, even with reference to age, a consensus exists.
A national consensus, specifically against imposing the death penalty on
society’s youngest adults, has developed as young adults are facing execution
with less frequency. Of the states that still allow executions, “seven (7) have de
facto prohibitions on the execution of offenders under twenty-one (21) years of
age . . . .”27 Moreover, between 2011 and 2016, only nine states executed
people who were considered young adults at the time of the offense.28 Thirtythree young adults were executed in total, and Texas, having executed nineteen
young adults, performed the majority of those executions.29 In 2015 alone,
Texas was responsible for the only five executions of young adults
nationwide.30 Excluding Texas, eight other states executed fourteen young
adults in total between 2011 and 2016, compared to twenty-nine executions of
young adults between 2006 and 2011, and twenty-seven executions between
2001 and 2006.31 Although many factors may influence these numbers, the
data indicates a developing national consensus against executing young adults.
Even though many states have not expressly exempted young adults from
receiving the death penalty, the actual practice of executing young adults is
becoming increasingly rare. When analyzing the numbers of executed people
who were between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one at the time of their
offenses, there is a significant downward trend in these executions.32 Between
25. Record Lows Set Across the U.S. for Death Sentences Imposed in 2018, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/7285 (last visited Nov. 6, 2019).
26. Facts About the Death Penalty, supra note 12. In 1999, 279 offenders were sentenced to death,
whereas only forty-two people were sentenced to the death penalty in 2018. Id.
27. Commonwealth v. Bredhold, No. 14-CR-161, 2017 WL 8792559, at *4 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Aug. 1, 2017)
(alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 5.
30. Brian Eschels, Data & the Death Penalty: Exploring the Question of National Consensus Against
Executing Emerging Adults in Conversation with Andrew Michaels’s A Decent Proposal: Exempting Eighteento Twenty-Year-Olds from the Death Penalty, 40 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 147, 152 (2016).
31. Bredhold, 2017 WL 8792559, at *5.
32. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof [Under 21 Years] in Support of Motion to
Preclude Death Penalty as Unconstitutional at exhibit C, Doe v. People (2015) (motion and exhibit on file with
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2006 and 2011, roughly eleven young adults were executed per year, but that
number has decreased.33 In 2012, six young adults were executed, and in 2013,
five young adults were executed; however, in 2014 and 2015, only three young
adults were executed each year.34 Similarly, the practice of sentencing those
who were between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one at the time of their
offense is low, in spite of the high criminality rates.35 Although 2017 had
roughly ten youthful offenders sentenced to death, in 2018, only four out of the
forty-three people sentenced to death nationwide were youthful offenders.36
Thus, in practice, a national consensus is strengthening against imposing
the death penalty on young adults. This consensus is supported by the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence on the death penalty. In Graham v. Florida, for example,
the Court found a national consensus against sentencing juveniles with nonhomicide charges to life without parole despite thirty-seven states and the
District of Columbia allowing the death penalty.37 In finding the existence of
such a consensus, the Court evaluated the “actual sentencing practices” of the
jurisdictions rather than simply accepting that these jurisdictions had no
express prohibition against giving juveniles with non-homicide charges life
without parole.38 As the Roper Court recognized with juveniles, this rare
practice of sentencing young adults to the death penalty does not “deny or
overlook the brutal crimes too many . . . offenders have committed,” it only
acknowledges the diminished culpability of young adults that contributes to
their exemption from the ultimate punishment.39
In 2017, a circuit court in Fayette, Kentucky took this emerging national
consensus into consideration when it found Kentucky’s death penalty statute
the author) (offering a chart reflecting the number of people between the ages of eighteen and twenty who
were executed from 2000 through July 15, 2015, broken down by state). This number does not account for
those who were twenty-one at the time of their offense.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Michaels, supra note 10, at 169. Regarding the high criminality of young adults, the Bureau of
Justice Programs (BJP) reported that, in 2010, the highest number of murder and non-negligent manslaughter
arrests were of nineteen-year-olds (744 arrests), with eighteen-year-olds coming in at a close second (709
arrests). HOWARD N. SNYDER, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE PATTERNS & TRENDS: ARREST IN THE UNITED STATES,
1990–2010, at 17 tbl.3 (2012), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/aus9010.pdf. In contrast, only 449 twentyfour-year-olds were arrested for murder and non-negligent manslaughter that same year. Id. When analyzing
older age groups, the number of arrests for murder and non-negligent manslaughter continued to decline. For
example, only 1849 people arrested murder and non-negligent manslaughter were between the ages of twentyfive and twenty-nine. Id. Although there may be many factors influencing such sentencing decisions, one
interpretation is a decline in support of sentencing these young adults to the death penalty.
36. Recent Death Sentences by Name, Race, County, and Year, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/2018-sentencing (last visited Nov. 6, 2019).
37. 560 U.S. 48, 62 (2010); Michaels, supra note 10, at 170 (“The Graham court noted that only 123
incarcerated juveniles were serving life without parole for non-homicide crimes committed as juveniles, and
contrasted those figures with statistics showing that nearly 400,000 juveniles were arrested for serious nonhomicide offenses in a single year.”).
38. Michaels, supra note 10, at 149–150.
39. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572 (2005).
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unconstitutional as applied to young adults in two cases. Judge Ernesto
Scorsone issued two opinions, one for Travis Bredhold and one for Efrian
Diaz, both eighteen-years-old at the time of their offenses.40 Judge Scorsone
stated that, “it appears there is a very clear national consensus trending toward
restricting the death penalty, especially in the case where defendants are
eighteen (18) to twenty-one (21) years of age.”41
C. POST-ROPER STUDIES SHOW THAT YOUNG ADULTS LACK THE MENTAL
CAPACITY TO UNDERSTAND AND APPRECIATE THEIR ACTIONS
Young and emerging adults are uniquely situated within the adult
population. As they turn eighteen and transition into adulthood, this
demographic of adults experiences greater independence than children, but
often does not yet take on the “enduring responsibilities that are normative in
adulthood.”42 These young adults, between the ages of eighteen and twentyone, begin to make significant choices in key areas of life such as occupation,
relationships, and education and begin to develop their own worldviews and
opinions,43 even before they develop the maturity to make thought-out and
well-reasoned decisions. Over the years, research pertaining to these adults has
developed to show that young adults are distinct from the rest of the older adult
population, not only situationally but developmentally.
In studies comparing the temperance and delinquency of adolescents,44
college-aged adults, and older adults, adolescents and college-aged adults
displayed greater similarities in temperance than college-aged and older
adults.45 In fact, “eighteen-to twenty-one-year-olds . . . [are] more similar to
ten- to seventeen-year-olds on indices of psychosocial maturity than they were
to adults twenty-six years of age and older.”46 As such, these young adults can
neither control their impulses as well as older adults nor understand and
40. Commonwealth v. Bredhold, No. 14-CR-161, 2017 WL 8792559 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Aug. 1, 2017);
Kentucky
v.
Efrain
Diaz,
No.
15-CR-584-001
(Ky.
Cir.
Ct.
Sept.
6,
2017),
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/files/pdf/KentuckyAge21DecisionEfrainDiaz.pdf.
41. Bredhold, 2017 WL 8792559, at *5.
42. Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Emerging Adulthood: A Theory of Development from the Late Teens Through
the Twenties, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 469, 469 (2000); see also Craig M. Bennett & Abigail A. Baird,
Anatomical Changes in the Emerging Adult Brain: A Voxel-Based Morphometry Study, 27 HUM. BRAIN
MAPPING 766 (2006) (explaining that changes in the brain signal that maturation is not complete until around
age twenty-five). In total recognition of their propensity to be irresponsible, emerging adults refer to “carrying
out one or more of the duties and responsibilities expected of fully developed individuals” as “adulting.” See
Adulting, URBAN DICTIONARY, https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=Adulting (last visited Nov.
6, 2019).
43. URBAN DICTIONARY, supra note 42.
44. Michaels, supra note 10, at 162 (defining temperance as “the ability to evaluate a situation before
acting,” and delinquency as the “involvement in stealing, property, and assault offenses”); Kathryn Lynn
Modecki, Addressing Gaps in the Maturity of Judgment Literature: Age Differences and Delinquency, 32 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 78, 79 (2008).
45. Michaels, supra note 10, at 162–63.
46. Id. at 163.
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evaluate future consequences “because gains in impulse control continue to
occur during the early twenties (20s).”47
Although significant changes in the brain begin at puberty, these changes
are not complete by the age of eighteen. Neurological research has shown that
when an adolescent turns eighteen, their prefrontal cortex, the part of the brain
“that helps . . . to inhibit impulses and to plan and organize . . . behavior to
reach a goal,” has not yet fully developed.48 Gray matter, brain cells credited
with carrying out higher brain functions such as regulating behavioral control,
does not reach full maturity until after the age of twenty.49 White matter,
attributed with facilitating communication within the brain through myelin and
myelination, similarly develops into the twenties.50 “Incomplete myelination is
believed to make eighteen- to twenty-year-olds more vulnerable to peer
pressure,”51 which influences young adults to respond in a manner that they
normally would not, absent the pressure.52
As neurological developments continue, young adults are also in the
process of maturing behaviorally.53 Research has shown that individuals
between the ages of eighteen and twenty cannot fully anticipate future
consequences, and they lack the ability to adequately understand rewards and
consequences.54 A psychological study found that young adults scored
significantly lower than older adults on tests that measured their ability to
evaluate situations before acting.55 Even until the age of twenty-five, the

47. Kentucky v. Efrain Diaz, No. 15-CR-584-001, at *6–*7 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Sept. 6, 2017),
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/files/pdf/KentuckyAge21DecisionEfrainDiaz.pdf.
48. Brain Maturity Extends Well Beyond Teen Years, NPR (Oct. 10, 2011, 12:00 PM),
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=141164708.
49. See Brief for the American Medical Ass’n & the American Academy of Child and Adolescent
Psychiatry as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 18–21, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (Nos.
08-7412, 08-7621) [hereinafter Brief for the AMA]; Michaels, supra note 10, at 166.
50. Laurence Steinberg, A Social Neuroscience Perspective on Adolescent Risk-Taking, 28 DEV. REV. 78
(2008) (offering scientific background on brain maturation); see also Brief for the AMA, supra note 49, at 22;
Michaels, supra note 10, at 166.
51. Michaels, supra note 10, at 166.
52. NPR, supra note 48.
53. Bennett & Baird, supra note 42, at 766.
54. Laurence Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Future Orientation and Delay Discounting, 80 CHILD
DEV. 28, 35 (2009); see also Elizabeth Cauffman et al., Age Differences in Affective Decision Making as
Indexed by Performance on the Iowa Gambling Task, 46 DEV. PSYCHOL. 193 (2010) (proposing that a
significant difference between adults and adolescents rests in their evaluation of rewards and consequences
when making decisions); Michaels, supra note 10, at 165; Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less
Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile
Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014 (2003) (“Although the identity crisis may occur in middle
adolescence, the resolution of this crisis, with the coherent integration of the various retained elements of
identity into a developed self, does not occur until late adolescence or early adulthood. Often this
experimentation involves risky, illegal, or dangerous activities like alcohol use, drug use, unsafe sex, and
antisocial behavior.” (alteration in original) (citing Alan S. Waterman, Identity Development from Adolescence
to Adulthood: An Extension of Theory and a Review of Research, 18 DEV. PSYCHOL. 341, 341 (1982))).
55. Michaels, supra note 10, at 162.
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human brain continues to mature and develop in areas such as judgment,
reasoning, and impulse control.56 This continuing development prevents young
adults from fully controlling their behavior or understanding that violating the
law is “morally wrong.”57 Consequently, young adults underestimate “the
number, seriousness, and likelihood of risks involved in a given situation”58
and “are more likely to engage in ‘sensation-seeking,’ the pursuit of arousing,
rewarding, exciting, or novel experiences.”59
Other studies have also shown that emotional abilities, such as the ability
to exercise self-control, to adequately “consider the risks and rewards of
alternative courses of action, and to resist coercive pressure from others,” form
after memory and logical reasoning have already developed in the brain.60
“Thus, one may be intellectually mature but also socially and emotionally
immature.”61 This juxtaposition of intellectual and emotional development
becomes more pronounced when young adults make decisions in “situations
that are emotionally arousing.”62 As a result, risky decision-making occurs
more frequently, and peer pressure has a greater effect on young adults as
compared to the rest of the adult population.63 In light of these significant
developments occurring both internally and within a social context, “[t]o cast
eighteen- to twenty-year-old offenders in the group most deserving of capital
punishment is to turn a blind eye to the realities of their behavioral,
psychological, and neurological predispositions.”64
Because young adults are limited by their own neurological developments
that are outside of their control, they should not be considered culpable enough
to deserve the death penalty. In fact, the brain continues to develop even after
an adult reaches the age of twenty-one. These developments continue after the
age of twenty-one significantly impacting how adults within this age range
interact with others and respond to different environments. The prefrontal
cortex, the part of the brain responsible for impulse control, is not fully
56. Caulum, supra note 8, at 731.
57. Id. at 732.
58. Kentucky v. Efrain Diaz, No. 15-CR-584-001, at *6 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Sept. 6, 2017),
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/files/pdf/KentuckyAge21DecisionEfrainDiaz.pdf.
59. Id. (citing Cauffman et al., supra note 54; Laurence Steinberg et al., Around the World, Adolescence
Is a Time of Heightened Sensation Seeking and Immature Self-Regulation, 21 DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. e12532
(2018)).
60. Diaz, No. 15-CR-584-001, at *7.
61. Id. (citing Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature Than Adults? Minors’ Access to
Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA “Flip-Flop,” 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 583 (2009)).
62. Id. (citing Alexandra O. Cohen et al., When Is an Adolescent an Adult? Assessing Cognitive Control
in Emotional and Nonemotional Contexts, 4 PSYCHOL. SCI. 549 (2016)); Steinberg et al., supra note 54;
63. Id. (citing Dustin Albert et al., The Teenage Brain: Peer Influences on Adolescent Decision Making,
22 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 114 (2013)); Barbara R. Braams et al., Longitudinal Changes in
Adolescent Risk-Taking: A Comprehensive Study of Neural Responses to Rewards, Pubertal Development, and
Risk-Taking Behavior, 35 J. NEUROSCI. 7226 (2015); Elizabeth P. Shulman & Elizabeth Cauffman, Deciding
in the Dark: Age Differences in Intuitive Risk Judgment, 50 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 167 (2014)).
64. Michaels, supra note 10, at 167.
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developed until age twenty-five, meaning that older adults, those twenty-five
and over, are better able to control impulses, plan, and organize behaviors.65
During adolescence, a period that some researchers define as ranging from tento twenty-four years old, “neurocircuitry strengthens and allows for
multitasking, enhanced ability to solve problems, and the capability to process
complex information.”66 Studies have shown that gray matter “‘seems to have
completed its most dramatic structural change’ by age 25,” and white matter
continues to form after the age of twenty-five but at a slower rate.67 The late
development of the limbic system and prefrontal cortex can also explain why
adolescents, or young adults, rely more on emotions and feelings when making
decisions and why they act more impulsively than adults with fully developed
brains.68 Because brain development continues until around the age of twentyfive (and possibly after),69 credible arguments can be made that the death
penalty should not be applied to adults under the age of twenty-five.
However, even though brain development continues into the midtwenties, the changes occurring in the brains of these adults “appear[] to be one
of fine-tuning.”70 The developments, although significant, are “facilitated by
the more extensive connectivity within and across brain areas.”71 In a study
about risk-taking, Laurence Steinberg found that higher risk-taking rates
existed among eighteen to twenty-one-year-olds even though as a whole,
adolescents and young adults engage in risky behavior more often than adults
over the age of twenty-five.72
Another study addressing crime and age revealed that by the early
twenties, half of active criminal offenders cease to engage in criminal activity,
whereas “by age 28, almost 85% of former delinquents desist from
offending.”73 The study revealed that the most significant decrease in criminal
activity occurred in the early twenties.74 Researchers, such as Sandra Aamodt,
have agreed that young adults can exhibit maturity at different ages, so setting
the legal age at twenty-five may not always be appropriate.75 Aamodt
suggested flexibility in the legal system to address the unique positions that

65. NPR, supra note 48.
66. Mariam Arain et al., Maturation of the Adolescent Brain, 9 NEUROPSYCHIATRIC DISEASE &
TREATMENT 449, 452 (2013).
67. Robin Marantz Henig, What Is it About 20-Somethings?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 18, 2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/22/magazine/22Adulthood-t.html?pagewanted=all.
68. Arain et al., supra note 66, at 453.
69. Id. at 451.
70. Steinberg, supra note 50, at 95.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 79.
73. Terrie E. Moffitt, Adolescence-Limited and Life-Course-Persistent Antisocial Behavior: A
Developmental Taxonomy, 100 PSYCHOL. REV. 674, 675 (1993).
74. Id.
75. NPR, supra note 48.
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young adults face as a result of their developing brains.76 Even though brain
maturation is occurring in a young adult who is twenty-five, that twenty-fiveyear-old has more culpability for his or her actions than a younger adult who is
under the age of twenty-one. Because the brain is still changing until the age of
twenty-five, legislatures, courts, or voters should, at a minimum, raise the age
eligibility of the death penalty to twenty-one which would more accurately
reflect culpability. Such a change is supported by California legislation.
II. CALIFORNIA’S LAWS REFLECT LEGISLATIVE INTENT TO PROTECT YOUNG
ADULTS
The California Legislature has chosen to treat young adults with special
care and attention through various laws, regulations, and programs that are not
just limited to one context but rather span many different sectors of the legal
field including the criminal justice system, the family law sector, and consumer
protection laws. Taken together, these legislative acts demonstrate an intent to
protect young adults from the world they are forced to enter when they turn
eighteen. By affording young adults special protections, the legislature’s
actions imply that young adults should not be considered among the most
culpable and as a result, should not be eligible for the death penalty. As shown
below, each legislative act uniquely seeks to insulate and assist young adults as
they transition into adulthood.
A. CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS
Recently, the legislature enacted two historic regulations concerning
people under the age of twenty-one. In 2016, California became the second
state to raise the minimum age at which an adult could legally purchase
cigarettes from eighteen to twenty-one,77 and in 2017, the legislature created
the Medicinal and Adult-Use Cannabis Regulation and Safety Act
(MAUCRSA) after California citizens passed Proposition 64, the Adult Use of
Marijuana Act in 2016.78 Both Proposition 64 and MAUCRSA limit the
recreational use of cannabis to those over the age of twenty-one.79 In both
instances, the legislature was concerned with the harmful health consequences
76. Id.
77. Lisa Aliferis, California Raises Age of Tobacco Purchase to 21 and Tightens Vaping Rules, NPR
(May 5, 2016, 10:58 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/05/05/476872674/california-raisesage-of-tobacco-purchase-to-21-and-tightens-vaping-rules. Hawaii was the first state to raise the legal age
requirement to twenty-one and, as of Nov. 6, 2019, thirteen other states have followed suit. States and
Localities that Have Raised the Minimum Legal Sale Age for Tobacco Products to 21, CAMPAIGN FOR
TOBACCO-FREE
KIDS,
https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/assets/content/what_we_do/state_local_issues/sales_21/states_localities_ML
SA_21.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2019).
78. Cannabis Legislation, CAL. CANNABIS PORTAL, https://cannabis.ca.gov/cannabis-legislation (last
visited Nov. 6, 2019).
79. Id.
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of cigarette and marijuana use, as well as young adults’ susceptibility to
addiction and peer pressure with respect to the use of these products.80
1. Tobacco Laws
On May 4, 2016, Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr. approved California
Senate Bill 7, which amended the Stop Tobacco Access to Kids Enforcement
(STAKE) Act, effectively raising the legal smoking age from eighteen to
twenty-one.81 In creating and pursuing this bill, the legislature was motivated
by health concerns and successfully amended the Business and Professions
Code section 22951 to reflect this motivation.82 Section 22951 now reads:
“The Legislature finds and declares that reducing and eventually eliminating
the illegal purchase and consumption of tobacco products by any person under
21 years of age is critical to ensure the long-term health of our state’s
citizens.”83 After Governor Brown signed the bill, Senator Ed Hernandez, the
lead author of the bill, stated, “What this means for California is now we can
know that our youth are less likely to be addicted to this horrible drug of
tobacco . . . [and] we’re going to reduce health care costs and save lives.”84
The legislature’s decision to raise the minimum age was noteworthy because it
indicated a concern for the addictive qualities of cigarettes and the impacts that
this specific activity can have on a young adult’s health. This decision was
significant because it was made in the face of forty-eight other states that
allowed young adults, upon turning eighteen and reaching legal adulthood, to
make such decisions impacting their health and future. 85
To that point, the American Lung Association supported the bill, saying
that “delaying the age when youth first use tobacco can reduce their likelihood
of transitioning to regular tobacco users.”86 The author of the bill estimated
that ninety percent of people who use tobacco begin using it before the age of

80. Tobacco Products: Minimum Legal Age: Hearings Before Sen. Comm. on Pub. Health and
Developmental Servs., 2015–2016 Leg., 2 (Cal. 2016) [hereinafter Tobacco Products: Minimum Legal Age
Hearings] (statement of Sen. Ed Hernandez, Chairman, Sen. Comm. on Pub. Health and Developmental
Servs.) (“Research shows that nicotine exposure has a dynamic impact on developing brains in smaller doses
and leads to increased vulnerability to addiction, impulsivity, and mood disorders.”); see also ASSEMB. FLOOR
ANALYSIS, S.B. 7, 2015–2016 Leg., 2 (Cal. 2016) (“[A]dolescent brains are more vulnerable to nicotine
addiction . . . . [T]he evidence and need are clear on the legal age for tobacco and now is time for us to make
this change.”).
81. See S.B. 7, 2015–2016 Leg. (Cal. 2016); Assemb. B. 64, 2017–2018 Gen. Assemb. (Cal. 2017).
Proposition 64, which the legislature expanded on, was based on a desire to prevent adolescents from
purchasing marijuana and, in doing so, included young adults with adolescents in this prohibition. See id. § 3.
82. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22951 (West 2019).
83. Id.; see also CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17537.3, 22952, 22956, 22958, 22963 (West 2019); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 308 (West 2019) (referring to twenty-one as an age requirement); Cal. Assemb. B. 64.
84. Aliferis, supra, note 77 (alteration in original).
85. See States and Localities that Have Raised the Minimum Legal Sale Age, supra note 77 (following
California and Hawaii’s lead, sixteen other states have since raised the minimum age to twenty-one).
86. ASSEMB. FLOOR ANALYSIS 5, S.B. 7, 2015–2016 Leg., 2 (Cal. 2016).
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twenty-one, and “80% of lifetime users start before the age of 18.”87 Because
nicotine is an addictive and psychoactive substance, it directly influences
emotional and cognitive processes in the brain and can cause cell damage and
cell loss.88 Nicotine also affects “reward pathways and circuits involved in
learning, memory, and mood,” which is “likely to contribute to increased
addiction and long-term behavioral problems in adolescents.”89 With this
research in mind, the legislature’s decision to raise the age at which a young
adult can purchase and smoke cigarettes indicates that scientific research has a
significant impact on how the legislature makes decisions in regard to young
adults and their susceptibility to outside influences.
Because young adults are more susceptible to peer pressure and their
brains continue to develop beyond the age of twenty-one, the legislature’s
decision to prohibit these adults from smoking and purchasing cigarettes shows
that the legislature does not fully trust a young adult’s decision-making
capabilities. Senator Ed Hernandez stated, “We can no longer afford to sit on
the sidelines while big tobacco markets to our kids and gets another generation
of young people hooked on a product that will ultimately kill them.”90 Senator
Hernandez’s rationale in raising the minimum age reflects studies revealing the
susceptibility of young adults to peer pressure.91 Studies have revealed that
young adults are influenced by the smoking behaviors of those around them.92
These findings support the notion that the brain of a young adult is still in a
season of transition, and thus, age must be considered when determining
whether a young adult should be held responsible for their choices and
decisions that can have significant impacts on their futures. The legislature’s
progressive decision to take away a young adult’s ability to purchase cigarettes
shows a significant shift in how people under the age of twenty-one are
protected and distinguished from the rest of the adult population.
2. Marijuana Laws
Similarly, in 2017, the legislature passed California Senate Bill 94 (SB
94), creating MAUCRSA, which legalized the recreational use of cannabis for

87. Tobacco Products: Minimum Legal Age Hearing, at 2 (statement of Sen. Ed Hernandez, Chairman,
Sen. Comm. on Pub. Health and Developmental Servs.)
88. Nicotine and the Developing Brain, UTAH DEP’T OF HEALTH (May 2018),
https://tobaccofreeutah.org/wp-content/uploads/youth-nicotine-and-brain-2017.pdf.
89. Id.
90. Alexei Koseff, Bill Would Raise California Smoking Age to 21, SACRAMENTO BEE (Jan. 30, 2015,
11:57 PM), https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/article8587841.html.
91. Tobacco Products: Minimum Legal Age Hearing, at 2 (statement of Sen. Ed Hernandez, Chairman,
Sen. Comm. on Pub. Health and Developmental Servs.).
92. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., PREVENTING TOBACCO USE AMONG YOUTH AND
YOUNG ADULTS: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 10 (2012) (defining young adults as between the ages
of eighteen to twenty-five).
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those twenty-one and over.93 Following the enactment of SB 94, the California
Department of Public Health (CDPH) launched an education and health
information campaign titled “Let’s Talk Cannabis,” providing information
about how cannabis can affect youth and young adults.94 The CDPH’s
campaign explained that smoking cannabis can harm the lungs and that young
adults face higher risks of poisoning if they ingest edibles too quickly.95 The
CDPH also emphasized that cannabis can affect one’s brain, which in turn can
impact one’s educational and professional goals.96 All these reasons supported
the legislature’s decision to prohibit young adults, between the ages of
eighteen and twenty, from using cannabis recreationally. It appears that a
primary concern of the CDPH was to ensure the health and safety of
California’s youth as they gain more responsibility as adults. Again, although
these young adults have reached the age of majority, the legislature still
exercises special and significant control over this subsection of the adult
population to ensure their maximum development and health.
B. FAMILY LAWS
In 2012, the California Fostering Connections to Success Act was
enacted.97 This bill allowed certain “non-minor dependents” youth between the
ages of eighteen and twenty-one, to continue to receive various forms of
support and aid by “extending payment benefits and transitional support
services for the Adoption Assistance Program (AAP) and the Kinship
Guardianship Assistance Payment (Kin-GAP) Program.”98 In implementing
93. Cannabis Legislation, supra note 78; see also CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 26000–26001, 26030,
26120, 26140, 26151–26152, 26155 (West 2019) (referencing the age requirement of twenty-one); CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1550.5 (West 2019) (referencing the age requirement of twenty-one); CAL. REV. & TAX.
CODE § 34017 (West 2019) (referencing the age requirement of twenty-one); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE §§ 11357–11359, 11362.1, 11362.3, 11362.45 (West 2019) (referencing the age requirement of twentyone); CAL. VEH. CODE § 2429.7 (West 2019) (requiring a task force to determine policy recommendations
about regulating impaired driving due to cannabis).
94. Youth and Cannabis: What You Should Know, CAL. DEP’T PUB. HEALTH,
https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/DO/letstalkcannabis/Pages/youth.aspx (last updated Nov. 17, 2017).
95. Id.; see also Cannabis Information for Health Care Providers, CAL. DEP’T PUB. HEALTH,
https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/DO/letstalkcannabis/CDPH%20Document%20Library/October%202017%
20Update/CDPH-Providers.pdf (last updated Oct. 17, 2017) (explaining the effects of cannabis on health and
goals).
96. Cannabis Information for Health Care Providers, supra note 95.
97. Assemb. B. 12, 2009–2010 Gen. Assemb. (Cal. 2010).
98. After 18 Program, CAL. DEP’T SOC. SERVS., http://www.childsworld.ca.gov/res/pdf/
AB12FactSheet.pdf (last updated Nov. 14, 2016); see also California Fostering Connections to Success Act:
Assembly Bill 12 Primer 10, ALL. FOR CHILDREN’S RIGHTS ET AL. https://kids-alliance.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/01/AB12-Primer-Jan-2014.pdf (last updated Jan. 1, 2014); Letter from Gregory E. Rose,
Deputy Dir., Child. And Fam. Servs. Division, Cal. Dep’t Soc. Servs. (Mar. 1, 2012),
http://www.cdss.ca.gov/lettersnotices/entres/getinfo/acl/2011/11-86.pdf. Transitional Independent Living Case
Plans “(1) to develop permanent connections with caring and committed adults (2) to develop independent
living skills and have opportunities for incremental responsibility and (3) to live in the least restrictive
placement,” and other programs and benefits are offered to these young adults. Id.
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the program, one goal was to allow these young adults to maintain a safety net
of support in a supervised living environment as they began to gain
independence.99 The legislature wanted to ensure that non-minor dependents
were given the opportunity to “make decisions regarding his or her housing,
education, employment, and leisure activities, while ensuring the availability
of ongoing support and assistance when difficulties are encountered.”100 By
extending benefits to these young adults, the legislature acknowledged that
non-minor dependents, specifically those in the foster care system, require
additional support as they transition into adulthood.
Although these services are only available to foster youth who meet
certain ongoing requirements, the rationale behind the extension of benefits
and assistance is significant. In Wellness and Institutions Code section
11403.1, the legislature wrote:
[F]ormer foster youth are a vulnerable population at risk of homelessness,
unemployment, welfare dependency, incarceration, and other adverse
outcomes if they exit the foster care system unprepared to become selfsufficient. Unlike many young individuals 18 years of age who can depend
on family for ongoing support while they complete postsecondary
education or develop career opportunities, emancipating foster youth have
their primary source of support, AFDC-Foster Care payments, terminated at
18 years of age and are then dependent on their own resources for selfsupport. Some foster youth are not able to complete high school or other
education or training programs due to ongoing trauma from the parental
abuse or neglect and gaps in their educational attainment stemming from
the original removal and subsequent changes in placement.101

Thus, the legislature’s rationale acknowledges that young adults generally
receive and should receive support from others as they transition into
adulthood. Whether or not a youth is in the foster care system, young adults
depend on older, wiser, more settled adults to help them navigate the added
responsibilities that come with adulthood. However, specifically regarding
foster youth, the legislature explained that participating in and completing an
educational or training program is a necessary, minimal skill for a foster youth
to “be competitive in today’s economy.”102 Here, the legislature ensured more
support and resources for this marginalized group of adults even after reaching
the age of majority. Entering into adulthood comes with added difficulties, and
young adults, regardless of upbringing—however, more acutely felt by those
with traumatic childhoods—need additional help to thrive in society and
succeed. On a basic level, young adults simply lack the maturity of older adults
99. California Fostering Connections to Success Act, supra note 98.
100. A.B. 12 / 212: California Fostering Connections to Success Act, CAL. COURTS: THE JUD. BRANCH OF
CAL., http://www.courts.ca.gov/7988.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2019); Extended Foster Care Rules and Forms,
CAL.
COURTS:
THE
JUD.
BRANCH
OF
CAL.,
http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/
Extended_Foster_Care_Rules_and_Forms.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2019).
101. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11403.1(a)(1) (West 2019).
102. Id. § 11403.1(a)(2).
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who have already successfully entered into society.103 With the legislature
acknowledging the difficulty of transitioning into adulthood, they should also
recognize that young adults should not be treated the same as older adults in
the criminal justice system.
C. SPECIAL ACCOMMODATIONS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
In 2016, the legislature acknowledged yet again how young adults are in a
different season developmentally and transitionally than older adults.104 This
time the legislature sought to provide additional support within the criminal
justice system for young adults who committed certain crimes. California
Senate Bill 1004 (SB 1004) created a five-county pilot program that would run
until 2020 and allow “transitional adult youth” (youth between ages eighteen to
twenty) to serve time in a juvenile detention facility, rather than adult county
jail, if they entered a plea.105 Originally, this program was approved for five
counties: Alameda, Butte, Napa, Nevada, and Santa Clara counties, but in
2018, Governor Brown signed SB 1106, which extended the duration of the
program until 2022 and expanded it to include Ventura County.106 SB 1004
and 1106 allow young adults, who are in transitional and pivotal life stages, not
only legally but developmentally, to receive services in a juvenile detention
facility that they would be otherwise unable to access in adult prison. Although
these provisions only apply to non-violent, non-serious offenses, it is a
significant step in acknowledging the unique impact that the criminal justice
system has on young adults. The author of the SB 1004 explained:
While legally they are adults, young offenders age 18–21 are still
undergoing significant brain development and it’s becoming clear that this
age group may be better served by the juvenile justice system with
corresponding age appropriate intensive services. Research shows that
people do not develop adult-quality decision-making skills until their early
20s. This can be referred to as the “maturity gap.” Because of this, young
adults are more likely to engage in risk seeking behavior. 107

103. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005) (“Their own vulnerability and comparative lack of
control over their immediate surroundings mean juveniles have a greater claim than adults to be forgiven for
failing to escape negative influences in their whole environment.”).
104. S.B. 1004, 2015–2016 Leg. (Cal. 2016); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1000.7 (West 2019). CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1000.7 is repealed as of Jan. 1, 2020 by its own provisions. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1000.7.
105. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1000.7.
106. S.B. 1106, 2017–2018 Leg. (Cal. 2018). The bill analysis of SB 1106 stated that Ventura County was
added to “provide valuable information,” and the sunset date was extended to ensure that the program would
“operate for a length of time that delivers the most comprehensive and evidence based evaluation.” ASSEMB.
FLOOR ANALYSIS, S.B. 1106, 2017–2018 Leg., 4 (Cal. 2018).
107. ASSEMB. FLOOR ANALYSIS, S.B. 1104, 2015–2016 Leg., 4 (Cal. 2016).
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Specifically, in passing SB 1004, the legislature considered the recent
scientific research pertaining to the development of adolescents’ brains.108 In
the bill analysis, the legislature acknowledged that young adults are not
similarly situated with the rest of the adult population, especially when placed
into the criminal justice system and that eighteen to twenty-year-olds “may be
better served in the juvenile justice system with age appropriate intensive
services.”109According to the Chief Probation Officers of California:
In order to address the criminogenic and behavioral needs of adolescents, it
is important that developmental age appropriate services are provided.
Juvenile detention facilities have such services available for adolescents
including, but not limited to, cognitive behavioral therapy, mental health
treatment, vocational training, and education among other programming
intended to specifically address the needs of the emerging adolescent
brain.110

This rationale mirrors that of the Roper Court, which found that juveniles
were more susceptible to making “immature and irresponsible” decisions and
such susceptibility means they have a “greater claim . . . to be forgiven.”111
Although the Transitional Age Youth Pilot Program is still being piloted,
its implementation signifies an important step ensuring that young adults are
given adequate assistance within the criminal justice system. Young adults are
still in a pivotal time of development despite having reached the age of
majority. The program not only validates the developmental shortcomings of
these adults but gives them additional support and programing that older adults
in the criminal justice system do not always receive.
D. PROPOSED PROVISIONAL LICENSING FOR SAFER DRIVING
In September of 2017, California Assembly Bill 63 (AB 63), a bill aimed
at protecting young drivers, was vetoed by Governor Brown after being
approved by both the Assembly and Senate.112 Had it been signed, the law
would have taken effect January 1, 2020, extending the provisional license
program from the age of eighteen to twenty-one. The bill proposed that, if
someone received their license between the ages of sixteen and twenty-one,
that new driver would have a twelve-month provisional license with which
108. S.B. 1004 § 2 (quoting the Chief Probation Officers of California who stated that “[r]ecent research
on the adolescent brain development has found that brain development continues well after an individual
reaches 18 years of age.”).
109. ASSEMB. FLOOR ANALYSIS, S.B. 1104, 2015–2016 Leg., 4 (Cal. 2016).
110. Governor Brown Signs Transitional Age Youth Pilot Program Legislation Relying on Mounting
Brain Research of Treatment Options for Youthful Offenders Age 18–21, CHIEF PROB. OFFICERS OF CAL.,
https://www.cpoc.org/post/governor-brown-signs-transitional-age-youth-pilot-program-legislation-relyingmounting-brain (last visited Nov. 6, 2019).
111. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005).
112. Assemb. B. 63, 2017–2019 Gen. Assemb. (Cal. 2017); Alexei Koseff, Jerry Brown Vetoes New
Restrictions for Rookie Drivers Under 21, SACRAMENTO BEE (last updated Oct. 7, 2017, 4:54 PM),
https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/article177653871.html.
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they could not drive between 11:00 p.m. and 5:00 a.m. and would be required
to “keep in his or her possession a copy of his or her class schedule or work
schedule as documentation to satisfy the exceptions for a school or schoolauthorized activity and employment necessity.”113
In passing the bill, the legislature was influenced by the State Department
of Public Health’s EpiCenter, as well as by data from the National Center for
Injury Prevention and Control of the federal Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention.114 According to these organizations, “unintentional injuries are the
leading cause of death and hospitalizations for California’s children and youth
between 1 and 19 years of age.”115 The reports indicated that vehicle crashes
involving youth, ages nineteen and under, cost $110 million in medical
expenses and $387 million in medical and wage loss costs combined.116
According to the California Department of Motor Vehicles, at least thirty-five
percent of teenagers in California get their driver’s license when they are
eighteen or nineteen years old.117 Furthermore, legislative history quoted
California’s 2015–19 Strategic Highway Safety Plan (SHSP) Implementation
Plan, which stated, “‘Young drivers have less driving experience, may be less
likely to identify hazardous conditions and react to them, and are
disproportionately involved in risky driving behaviors that directly result in
more crashes than experienced drivers.”118 These sources reaffirm that young
adults are a distinct subsection of the adult population and necessitate added
protection and oversight for their own safety and the safety of others.
Despite the Legislature’s passage of the bill, Governor Brown vetoed AB
63. He explained:
While I understand the author’s intent of needing to address factors that
contribute to the unnecessary collisions and deaths of young Californians
on our highways, the provisions of this bill create a burden on a segment of
adult Californians that are no longer seen as a minor in the eyes of the
law.119

Governor Brown’s rationale in vetoing the bill reemphasizes what the law
already acknowledges: eighteen to twenty-year-olds are autonomous adults.
His opposition to the proposed legislation stemmed, in part, from a concern
that it would “burden” young adults by limiting freedoms currently afforded to
their age group. In the context of the death penalty, raising age eligibility for
the death penalty would not burden young adults but would protect them from

113. Cal. Assemb. B. 63.
114. See id. § 1.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Driver’s Licenses: Instructional Permits and Provisional Licenses: Hearings Before Assemb. Comm.
on Transp., 2017–2018 Gen. Assemb. 3 (Cal. 2017) (statement of Jim Fraazier, Chair, Comm. on Transp.)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
119. Koseff, supra note 112.
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a punishment that may be too harsh given their limitations and diminished
culpability. Such a sentence should be reserved for the most culpable
offenders, not simply those who are “no longer seen as a minor in the eyes of
the law.”120 In vetoing AB 63, Governor Brown indicated that focusing on
better driver education and training would help address safety concerns;
however, his rationale fails to address scientific research demonstrating that
young adults lack adequate impulse control and have increased risk-taking
habits.121 Although further education and programing for young adults to help
ensure they are productive and positive members of society is important,
young adults are limited by the developments occurring within them as they
age. In the context of the death penalty, young adults sentenced to death are
given no opportunity to move beyond their convictions or to see if their
decision-making processes evolve as their brains mature. Rather, the death
sentence seals their fate and inhibits these young offenders from receiving any
form of rehabilitation as their brains mature.
Although AB 63 will not go into effect, the legislature’s rationale behind
the bill continues to show a trend of acknowledging that young adults do not
possess the maturity and restraint that the rest of the adult population possesses
and thus, are not among the most culpable offenders worthy of the most severe
form of punishment.122
E.

LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS TO FOSTER CIVIC ENGAGEMENT BEFORE
ADULTHOOD

Although eighteen is the recognized age of adulthood, the legislature has
sought to engage and encourage adolescents to be civically engaged before
they are legally able to vote. In September of 2014, Governor Brown approved
California Senate Bill 113 (SB 113), which lowered the age at which one could
pre-register to vote from seventeen years old to sixteen years old.123 In support
of the bill, Senator Hannah-Beth Jackson, the author, argued that “the earlier
people are introduced to voting, the more likely they are to become life-long
participants in democracy.”124 This bill came after the 2012 presidential
election, in which only sixty-two percent of Californians between the ages of
eighteen and twenty-four were registered to vote.125 Senator Jackson noted that
these young adults were registering at a lower rate than other age groups and
were not voting at rates reflective of the size of their age group.126 Although
120. Id.; accord Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (describing culpability as one of the main
determinants of death eligibility).
121. NPR, supra note 48.
122. See generally Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (holding that the death penalty should be reserved for the most
culpable offenders).
123. S.B. 113, 2013–2014 Leg. (Cal. 2014).
124. S. FLOOR ANALYSIS, S.B. 113, 5.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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this bill allows youth to pre-register to vote in hopes of larger voter turnouts at
future elections, the voting age remains set at eighteen despite attempts to
lower it.
In September of 2017, the legislature rejected an effort to lower the
voting age in California. Earlier that year, Assemblyman Evan Low and
Assemblywoman Lorena Gonzalez Fletcher introduced Assembly
Constitutional Amendment 10 (ACA 10), which sought to amend the
California Constitution and lower the legal voting age to seventeen years
old.127 The comments behind the Amendment indicated that lowering the
voting age would help young people build a habit of voting and that “many 18year-olds are in a time of intense transition, but at 17, young people can cast
their crucial first votes at a time when they are still connected to their school,
home, and community.”128 When taken to the Assembly, the Amendment
failed, but together, ACA 10 and SB 113 signal an effort to entrust youth with
greater responsibility and a desire to foster productive habits while youth are
under the supervision of adults. The legislature seems inclined to help youth be
more engaged by the time they reach the age of majority, but ultimately is
resistant to letting juveniles actually cast a vote.
Voting is a crucial aspect of our democracy. Young adults are entrusted
with this significant responsibility, that at face value, counters arguments in
support of raising death penalty eligibility. Having the right to vote implies that
young adults are capable to make significant decisions that will impact their
future; however, such assumptions do not necessarily contradict research
supporting raising the age eligibility for the death penalty. The judgment
necessary to make unhurried decisions, in which one can consult with others,
has developed by the time one turns sixteen.129 This type of judgment is called
“cold cognition.”130 Contrary to the type of judgment used in situations
“characteri[z]ed by heightened emotions, time pressure, or the potential for
social coercion” (hot cognition), cold cognition is not likely mature until adults
reach the age of twenty-one.131 Even though the legislature has bestowed the
right to vote upon young adults, such a responsibility does not contradict how a
young adult remains less culpable than an older adult when facing a sentence
in the criminal justice system. The legislature’s own efforts to shelter young
adults in the criminal justice system, the family law sector, and through
consumer protection laws indicate their acknowledgment that young adults

127. ASSEMB. CONST. AMEND. 10, 2017–2018 Leg. (Cal. 2017).
128. Elections: Voter Qualifications: Hearings Before Assemb. Comm. on Elections & Redistricting,
2017–2018 Leg. 2 (Cal. 2017) (statement of Nichole Becker, Principal Consultant) (quoting Generation
Citizen—VOTE16USA, an organization in support of the amendment).
129. Laurence Steinberg, Let Science Decide the Voting Age, NEW SCIENTIST (Oct. 8, 2014),
https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22429900-200-let-science-decide-the-voting-age.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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should not be treated the same as older adults when it comes to criminal
culpability.
III. ARGUMENTS
A. THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE SHOULD IMPOSE A MINIMUM-AGE
CRITERIA THAT PROTECTS YOUNG ADULTS FROM THE HARSHEST FORM
OF PUNISHMENT
“The Legislature is . . . accorded the broadest discretion possible in
enacting penal statutes and in specifying punishment for crime[s].”132 Thus, the
California Legislature could and should amend its death penalty statutes to
exempt young adults from capital punishment. Such an amendment would be
supported by the legislature’s numerous demonstrations of a collective belief
that young adults need special protections from themselves and society.
Indeed, it is perplexing that a legislature that finds young adults in need of
special protections spanning many fields of California law does not also
safeguard young adults from the death penalty, the most severe form of
punishment. After all, “[t]he reasons why juveniles,” or young adults in
California, “are not trusted with the privileges and responsibilities of” other
adults “explain[s] why their irresponsible conduct is not as morally
reprehensible as that of” older adults.133 If the distinctions between young
adults and older adults were not persuasive, the legislature would not pass bills
that limit young adults’ freedoms in order to protect them from their inability
to make mature, rational choices.
Moreover, the choice to raise the minimum-age criteria for the death
penalty would acknowledge the statewide consensus that has developed
regarding the imposition of death sentences on young adults. Sentencing data
shows that between 2000 and 2015 only twelve of California’s fifty-eight
counties imposed death sentences on a young adult.134 Conversely, roughly
eighty percent of California’s counties have not sentenced a young adult
offender to the death penalty in over almost two decades.135 This statistic could
132. People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 888 (Cal. 1972), superseded by Constitutional amendment, CAL.
CONST. art. 1 § 27; accord Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 269 (1972) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103–104 (1958) (Warren, C.J., plurality opinion); Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 378–379 (1910).
133. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988).
134. Angela Marie Krueger, Number to DR.CA Counties.2000-2015 (data updated through 2015 and on
file with the author); Legal Process, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (July 11, 2018),
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/podcast/resources/Episode14LegalProcess.pdf (explaining that thirty-one counties
have recommended the death penalty on a defendant); 19 additional counties imposed the death penalty only
on people twenty-one and over between 2000 and 2015. Angela Marie Krueger, Number to DR.CA
Counties.2000-2015 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
135. See The Death Penalty in 2018: Year End Report, supra note 23 (reporting that Riverside, the
California county that sentenced the most people to death between 2015 and 2017, did not sentence a single
defendant to death in 2018; that Kern County and San Bernardino County also abstained from imposing the
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imply that a de facto death penalty exemption for young adults exists, despite
public opinion favoring the death penalty.
If the legislature were to grant statutory protection from capital
punishment, such a decision would not impede efforts to protect society from
those who have most appropriately received the death penalty. Even with an
age limitation, these young adults would still face sufficient punishment for
their actions.136 As Andrew Michaels contends, “exemption is not
exoneration.”137 Rather, the prohibition would reaffirm the notion that capital
punishment should be reserved for those who are most deserving of it. In other
words, it would reserve the ultimate punishment for those who were mature
enough to fully recognize the harm they were doing when they committed their
death-penalty-eligible crime and who had the self-control to behave
accordingly. Young adults should not be considered among the most culpable.
B. THE COURTS SHOULD RULE THE DEATH PENALTY UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS
APPLIED TO YOUNG ADULTS
Even if the legislature fails to amend the death penalty statutes in
accordance with its demonstrable efforts to shield young adults from the
consequences of making bad decisions, the courts can step in and rule the
death penalty unconstitutional as applied to young adults.138 In the past, the
Supreme Court of California did not shy away from declaring the death penalty
a violation of the Eighth Amendment,139 and today, it certainly should not
experience any trepidation in declaring the death penalty, as applied to
eighteen- to twenty-year-olds, either a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s
cruel and unusual standard or the state constitution’s “cruel or unusual”
standard. Although voters of the 1970s reacted against the Supreme Court’s

death penalty on defendants in 2018 despite having employed it in prior years; that Los Angeles County only
sentenced two people to death in 2018; and that Orange Country only sentenced one person to death in 2018);
see also Maura Dolan, Death Sentences Plummet Across California. Riverside County, Which Led the U.S. in
2017,
Has
Had
Zero
This
Year,
L.A.
TIMES
(Dec.
13,
2018,
9:05
PM),
https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-death-penalty-cases-california-20181213-story.html
(“Five
California counties, among the 10 with the most death sentences nationwide in the last five years, either had no
sentences or no more than two, according to the report by the Death Penalty Information Center.”).
136. Courts could still sentence young adults to life without the possibility of parole, a sentence that many
argue is worse than the death penalty because it deprives an individual of any hope that they might re-enter
society one day.
137. Michaels, supra note 10, at 176.
138. People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 888 (Cal. 1972), superseded by Constitutional amendment, CAL.
CONST. art. 1 § 27 (“The Legislature is . . . accorded the broadest discretion possible in enacting penal statutes
and in specifying punishment for crime, but the final judgment as to whether the punishment it decrees exceeds
constitutional limits is a judicial function.” (emphasis added)); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 269
(1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103–104 (1958) (Warren, C.J., plurality
opinion); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378–379 (1910).
139. See Anderson, 493 P.2d at 895, superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 27.
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progressivity then, the State’s current populous might not take issue with a
more moderate constraint on death penalty sentencing.140
1.

Imposing Death Sentences on Young Adults Violates the Eighth
Amendment

What qualifies as cruel and unusual punishment in the United States
Constitution has been debated since the Eighth Amendment was ratified in
1791.141 Apart from “barbaric” forms of punishment that are uncontested
Eighth Amendment violations, other forms of punishment cause the Court to
question what this standard really means.142 Based on this jurisprudence, the
Eighth Amendment is not a static standard that refuses to change over time.
Rather, cruel and unusual punishment is evaluated by “the evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”143 These evolving
standards are measured by objective factors, namely, “(1) state legislation, (2)
sentencing decisions of juries, and (3) the views of entities with relevant
expertise”—these standards are, in fact, very high.144
Over the years, the Supreme Court has been hesitant to find controversial
forms of punishment cruel and unusual.145 However, the Court does allow for
evolution of this standard when it is clearly warranted. As Justice Kennedy
noted, “The Eighth Amendment ‘is not fastened to the obsolete but may
acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane
justice.’”146 Thus, this vague standard is malleable and evolving. It demands
review when change is due, as is the case here with respect to exempting
young adults from receiving the death penalty.
Indeed, the Court’s proportionality doctrine has given way to several
categorical exemptions from the death penalty over the last two decades. In
2002, the Court determined that it was cruel and unusual to allow the
“mentally retarded” to face the death penalty, and in doing so, overturned a
prior decision made roughly a decade before that upheld the constitutionality
of sentencing these individuals to the death penalty.147 In 2005, the Court again
overturned a previous opinion when it found that sentencing juveniles to the
140. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
141. See Bryan A. Stevenson & John F. Stinneford, Common Interpretation: Eighth Amendment, NAT’L
CONSTITUTION
CTR.,
https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/interpretation/amendmentviii/clauses/103 (last visited Nov. 6, 2019).
142. Id.
143. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561 (2005) (Warren, C.J., plurality opinion) (quoting Trop, 356
U.S. at 100–01)).
144. Evolving Standards of Decency, A.B.A. (Juv. Just. Ctr., Washington D.C.), Jan. 2004, at 1.
145. See e.g., Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 41 (2008) (holding that Kentucky’s lethal injection

protocol did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment).
146. Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 708 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910)).
147. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (using “mentally retarded;” however, today such
terminology would not be used); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), abrogated by Atkins, 536
U.S. at 321.
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death penalty was cruel and unusual.148 In 2008, the proportionality doctrine
was extended to nonhomicide offenders.149 Pertinently, in 2010 and 2012, the
Court categorically exempted juvenile offenders found guilty of non-homicide
offenses from life without parole.150 In mapping the Court’s development of
the proportionality standard, the time has come for another categorical
exemption to be imposed; Roper should be extended to eighteen- to twentyyear-olds.
2.

Imposing Death Sentences on Young Adults Violates Article 1,
Section 27 of the California Constitution

During the sentencing phase of a case in which the State is seeking the
death penalty, the trier of fact is required to take numerous aggravating and
mitigating factors into account; one of which is the defendant’s age.151
Currently, California law leaves room for the trier of fact to weigh a

148.
149.
150.
151.

Roper, 543 U.S. at 578–79.
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 446 (2008).
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 2019). The factors to be considered include:

(a) The circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding
and the existence of any special circumstances found to be true pursuant to Section 190.1.
(b) The presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or
attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence.
(c) The presence or absence of any prior felony conviction.
(d) Whether or not the offense was committed while the defendant was under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
(e) Whether or not the victim was a participant in the defendant’s homicidal conduct or consented
to the homicidal act.
(f) Whether or not the offense was committed under circumstances which the defendant reasonably
believed to be a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct.
(g) Whether or not defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of
another person.
(h) Whether or not at the time of the offense the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as a
result of mental disease or defect, or the [e]ffects of intoxication.
(i) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
(j) Whether or not the defendant was an accomplice to the offense and his participation in the
commission of the offense was relatively minor.
(k) Any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal
excuse for the crime.
After having heard and received all of the evidence, . . . the trier of fact shall consider . . . the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances referred to in this section, and shall impose a sentence of
death if the trier of fact concludes that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances. If the trier of fact determines that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the
aggravating circumstances the trier of fact shall impose a sentence of confinement in state prison
for a term of life without the possibility of parole.
Id. (emphasis added).
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defendant’s young age either in favor of or against imposing the death penalty
on a young adult. Based on the breadth of research establishing that young
adults have a diminished capacity to exercise self-control, adequately consider
the consequences of their actions, and resist coercive pressures from others, a
young adult’s age should be seen, in the least, as a mandatory mitigating
factor. Taking the culmination of this research a step further, however,
California’s courts should deliver a bright-line rule that categorically exempts
anyone under the age of twenty-one from being sentenced to death. Although
the California Constitution provides that the death penalty “shall not be
deemed to be, or to constitute, the infliction of cruel or unusual
punishments,”152 this statement speaks only to the use of the death penalty
generally, and not to its application to young adults.
In the past, the California Constitution has afforded its citizens extra
protections not found in the United States Constitution; this principle is known
as California constitutionalism.153 These extra provisions, however, decreased
over the years as hard-on-crime rhetoric began to pervade the criminal justice
system.154 As a result, the court rarely finds that a ballot initiative is
unconstitutional.155 Generally, the California Supreme Court chooses not to
strike down initiatives as unconstitutional and has established a reluctance to
assert its power over decisions that affect the political realm. As recently as
2018, the California Supreme Court had the opportunity to afford criminal
defendants more protections under the California Constitution but failed to do
so.156
Even with a reluctant Court, it is possible for a court in California to find
that the implementation of the death penalty on young adults is cruel and
unusual categorically, or even that the death penalty as applied to these young
adults is unconstitutional. Such a decision arguably could be upheld under
Article 1, section 27 of the California Constitution.
In determining whether a penalty constitutes cruel or unusual punishment,
the California courts must consider the nature of “the particular person before

152. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 27; accord CAL. CONST. art. I, § 17 (existing formerly as Article I, § 6, now
existing as Article I, § 17, and offering the basic declaration of rights that one shall not be subjected to cruel
and unusual punishment).
153. David Aram Kaiser, Opinion Analysis: People v. Buza, SCOCABLOG (Aug. 29, 2018),
http://scocablog.com/opinion-analysis-people-v-buza; see also David Aram Kaiser & David A. Carillo,
California Constitutional Law: Reanimating Criminal Procedural Rights After The “Other” Proposition 8, 56
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 33, 40–42 (2016).
154. Kaiser, supra note 153.
155. Id.; see Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077 (Cal. 1990); see also Kaiser & Carillo, supra note 153,
at 40 (determining that the Raven court found a section of Proposition 115 unconstitutional on the basis “that
[it] fundamentally limited the role of the state courts in interpreting and enforcing state constitutional
protections” (footnote omitted)).
156. People v. Buza, 413 P.3d 1132 (Cal. 2018) (taking up the question of constitutionality in a DNA
cheek swab); Kaiser, supra note 153. The Court of Appeal, however, found that it did violate the California
Constitution. People v. Buza, 180 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753 (Ct. App. 2014).
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the court,” asking “whether the punishment is grossly disproportionate to the
defendant’s individual culpability as shown by such factors as his age, prior
criminality, personal characteristics, and state of mind.”157 Given the
comprehensive body of research, this consideration creates the avenue by
which the California courts can raise the minimum age for death penalty
eligibility.
When considering the scientific and behavioral research regarding the
culpability of a particular defendant, one can conclude that although the
defendant’s crime may warrant significant punishment; imposing the most
severe punishment—the death penalty—is not warranted. Regardless of the
circumstances of the offense, a young adult’s punishment should reflect their
physiological limitations, such as the diminished capacity to make wellthought-out decisions. As such, young adults should receive sentences that
protect society without imposing death, for example, life without parole.158
Even though the court has been hesitant to provide extra protections under the
Constitution, such a decision would be a modest amendment to death penalty
practices.
C. CALIFORNIA’S VOTERS SHOULD DEMAND REFORM THROUGH THE
REFERENDUM PROCESS
Additionally, California’s initiative and referendum processes empower
its citizens to demand change. This mechanism has contributed to California’s
progressive political landscape and to occasional backslides such as the
passage of Proposition 17. While California’s referendum process has favored
application of the death penalty, the referendum process appears to be a viable
avenue through which death penalty reform could be achieved.
In 1972, months after the Supreme Court of California found the death
penalty unconstitutional, the people proposed Proposition 17 which would
amend the constitution making the death penalty constitutional once again.159
In the election that year, the proposition passed with a 67.5% approval rate,
and seven years later the California Supreme Court upheld the proposition as
constitutional.160 In 1978, the people then added Proposition 7 to the ballot
which, if passed, would have increased first and second-degree murder
penalties and expanded the circumstances through which one could have
received the death penalty.161 Proposition 7 passed by 70%.162
157. People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697, 721 (Cal. 1983).
158. I do not argue or believe that life without parole is a better alternative. Such a punishment is still too
severe; however, in this Note I am specifically addressing the impact of the death penalty on young adults.
159. California Proposition 17, Death Penalty in the California Constitution (1972), BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_17,_Death_Penalty_in_the_California_Constitution_(1972) (last
visited Nov. 6, 2019).
160. People v. Frierson, 559 P.2d 587, 614 (Cal. 1979); California Proposition 17, supra note 159.
161. California
Proposition
7,
the
Death
Penalty
Act
(1978),
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/California_Proposition_7,_the_Death_Penalty_Act_%281978%29 (last
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The next major referendum-initiated statute was proposed in 2012.
Proposition 34 would have repealed the death penalty and retroactively
changed death penalty sentences to life without the possibility of parole.163 The
proposition was defeated 52% to 48%.164 Four years later, California voted on
two more propositions that were initiated by the people: Proposition 62 and
66.165 As evidenced by the narrow results, abolitionist measures came close in
2012 and 2016, so perhaps the more moderate reform of raising the age of
eligibility through referendum might succeed.
History has shown that the referendum process is the most likely avenue
through which death penalty policies can be amended. Even though history
appears to show a desire on behalf of the people to keep the death penalty
active, the initiatives that have gained support and reached the ballot have been
sweeping measures aimed at eliminating the death penalty altogether or
maintaining it. However, a more conservative and moderate approach should
be proposed in which the age eligibility is raised from eighteen to twenty-one,
as science and the legislature have begun to coalesce around the idea that
young adults cannot be considered among the most culpable.166
CONCLUSION
Advances in neuroscience have proven that young adults—those between
the ages of eighteen and twenty—have a diminished capacity to exercise selfcontrol, to adequately consider the consequences of their actions, and to resist
coercive pressures from others. The California Legislature has acknowledged
this and responded by enacting numerous statutes targeted at insulating young
adults from the harms to which they are so vulnerable. To that end, the
legislature protects young adults from nicotine and marijuana addiction, from
homelessness and destitution, from the rehabilitative deprivations experienced
by more mature adults in the criminal justice system, and even from their own
lack of civic engagement.
However, aside from stating that a defendant’s age should be considered
as a potential mitigating factor in determining whether a defendant should be

visited Nov. 6, 2019); Matthew Green, To Kill or Not to Kill? California’s Death Penalty Debacle, KQED
NEWS (Oct. 23, 2012), https://www.kqed.org/lowdown/4301/should-california-kill-its-death-penalty.
162. California Proposition 7, supra note 161.
163. California Proposition 34, the End the Death Penalty Initiative (2012), BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_34,_the_End_the_Death_Penalty_Initiative_(2012) (last visited
Nov. 6, 2019).
164. Id.
165. See Proposition 62, supra note 18; See Proposition 66, supra note 18; see supra text accompanying
note 18.
166. California voters have been supporting modest criminal justice reform. In 2012, voters approved
Proposition 36, which modified the three strikes law, and in 2014, voters approved Proposition 47, which
allowed for certain felonies to be reduced to misdemeanors. The passage of these propositions signifies a
willingness to adjust standards of justice.
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sentenced to death, the law does not protect young adults from capital
punishment. The fact that eighteen- to twenty-year-olds are eligible for the
death penalty is not consistent with the legislature’s acknowledgment of the
“maturity gap” between young adults and the rest of the adult population. For
the most part, however, young adults are escaping death penalty sentences
because the practice of sentencing this age group to the death penalty is
becoming increasingly rare, both inside and outside of California. This is a
testament to shifting opinions on the practice of sentencing young adults to
death that should be reflected in the law through a clear exemption. While the
legislature can and should institute this rule, it could also be implemented by
the courts, or by the people through the referendum process. However, now,
even though California has a governor-issued moratorium, prosecutors can still
seek the death penalty, and young adults are still threatened by such a severe
punishment.
The cruel and/or unusual punishment standards are evaluated through the
lens of “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.”167 Through that lens, the courts should see that the practice of
subjecting young adults to death sentences is no longer proportional.
California’s voters have asserted their approval of the death penalty again and
again, thwarting the efforts of the courts to ensure the decency of the criminal
justice practice by impeding the tradition of killing criminal defendants.
However, those same voters should not thwart efforts to insulate eighteen- to
twenty-year-olds from the harsh realities of adulthood. Young adults do
commit serious crimes; however, because of their developing brains,
susceptibility to peer pressure, and because of the legislature’s desire to give
young adults added support as they transition into adulthood, young adults
should not be eligible for the death penalty in California.

167. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561 (2005) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958)
(Warren, C.J., plurality opinion)).
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